The Bewilderness

Pakistan draws towards the edge

Pakistan is entering a new political crisis, one that perhaps heralds encroachment towards the edge of state failure. This was deemed likely some years ago when the Pakistani Taliban expanded beyond the ungovernable North West Frontier provinces. Then, a balancing act between Islam, army, civil government and the United States led to a fightback.

The venal elites have proved as incapable of democratic trust. Activist judges react against Zardari with as much zeal as they fought Musharraf, that long forgotten figure of contempt. They wish to reopen corruption charges against President Zardari, which the government has refused to comply with. Even worse for the beleaguered party is a leaked memo hankering after US support in the event of a potential military coup. That would be touching the third rail.

Whilst the troubles rise, terrorism and violence are on the increase. Is it a matter of time before the Taliban again see an opportunity to assert greater control beyond their strongholds?

An Inundation

The Pakistani inundation (no lesser word can describe the scale of the disaster) has proved a godsend to those who wish to present the collapse of Pakistan as an inevitable event. Ignore complexity and contingency for the lure of the linear.

The Pakistani armed forces remain the strongest body capable of combating the disaster. They are assisted and occasionally supplanted by the Islamist charities, which reap short-term popularity for their efforts. Certain voices have stated that the official government has died in the afflicted regions; their authority neutered and overturned by the Islamist forces. It is, of course, too early to tell if the effect of the floods, over the next few months, will be the withering away of the existing state. This does seem a possibility.

The battering of Pakistan and the lack of resilience will tax the resource of the military to breaking point. Their attentions will be focused upon rebuilding Punjab and Sindh at the expense of counter-terrorist activities. The victories of the past few years will be hollowed out as the Taliban return in force to Buner and the Swat, regaining the political carve-out that they lost.

The unravelling of Pakistan continues.

 

Pakistani's catastrophe invites an Islamist solution

The floods that have hit the north-west region of Pakistan will prove a heavy burden for the government and the state. Pakistan's crisis is a crisis of legitimacy, where the acceptance of the state is challenged by religious fundamentalists who deny a division between Allah and Caesar. The problem for its elites lies in the acquiescence of the population to this challenge. The floods are now affecting 12 millions, and these 12 millions will accept help from any quarter. Once the waters subside and the anger crystallizes, they will range in their responses: a sullen fatalism, a radicalised anger, a disillusionment with democracy and a willingness to consider theocratic alternatives.

The national government's response has appeared chaotic at times, and confidence in its ability to cope has been shaken by the decision of President Asif Ali Zardari to visit France and England amid the crisis.

Reports have indicated that Islamist organisation fill some of the gaps in this uncoordinated response. It is not clear how extensive their organisations are, but they are quick to publicise their own aid, however feeble it may be. Yet, they may well have contributed to this chaos by weakening the traditional tribal structures and support networks that usually come into play during natural disasters. The Islamists in the north-west provinces may have reduced the resilience of these communities by their presence and actions.

The government is estimated to have brought some aid to 40% of the affected population, often in wretched conditions. Although, comparisons with the Islamist charities are difficult, the modus operandi provides some telling and tentative conclusions. US  and other western aid is mediated through other organisations and 'hidden':

American helicopters began evacuating people and ferrying supplies this week. But some of the $35 million in aid put up by Washington will come in cash or be channeled through local or international groups, denying the unpopular Americans the chance to improve their image with Pakistanis face to face.

The Islamist charities, aided by local knowledge and workers, can move swiftly to respond; their advantages are then milked for ideological advantage. The natural catastrophe will aid recruitment and financial support. It depends upon what form this takes: further substitution of the state by the Taliban, electoral support for Islamist parties, or an upsurge in terrorism? We will know by the autumn,

Pakistan faces extremes

Every time that a natural disaster hits Pakistan, the response from the enfeebled government is more than matched by the charity work of the extremist organisations. In scenes of chaos, first earthquakes, now floods, the extremist organisations act as a state within a state bringing aid and succour to people who have to rely upon the government and are let down.

The Pakistani state has proved exceptionally bad at dealing with natural catastrophes. Worse, this flooding has hit the North-West province, scene of fierce fighting to dislodge the Taliban only a few months ago. Military victory is short-term and met by popular reversal as the army has proven more adept at creating refugees than feeding mouths. This will only have the effect of increasing support for effective organisations. People will accept Islamist rules for certainty and a full belly.

The Taliban have suspended attacks for the duration. However, they are expected to profit from the disruption to NATO supplies and their Pakistani counterparts are moving fighters and supplies back into Buner, Swat and Orakzai. The floods may have undone the victory that Pakistan won last year in its counter-insurgency campaign and may prove a staging post on the long march to Islamabad.

Pakistan: a house divided and defiant

Robert Gates has concluded that Pakistan has not cut its ties with the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. Since Gates has always known this, why does he reveal this information now? What propels his revelation? Gates gave his evidence to the House Committee on International Affairs at the same time as the Pakistani Prime Minister was visiting Downing Street.

"They have maintained some of those contacts and those relationships, frankly, as a hedge because of their uncertainty whether the US would be a reliable partner and ally for them going forward and whether we would remain in Afghanistan until we were assured of success in taking care of the extremists."

This rebuke could be double-edged:aimed at prevarication within Obama's administration and duplicity in Pakistan. What it proves is that Pakistan remains wedded to its strategy of war towards the west and appeasement of jihadism. Despite the power of the Pakistani insurgency, the elites do not have the ability to overcome the strategic confusion that destabilises their polity: rivalry with India requires a jihadist state in Afghanistan and terrorist resources in Pakistan itself.

The response of Gilani to these accusations is internal posturing and external defiance:

Gilani warned that India was increasing its role in Afghanistan. He claimed Pakistani forces had captured all the militant strongholds in South Waziristan. He claimed the operation in Swat, where 2 million refugees had been displaced, most of whom returned to their homes in a space of 10 weeks, was a world first. But he warned military action alone would not crack the problem of the tribal areas which needed economic aid. Strikes by US drones had caused great concern in Pakistan. "We are fighting our own war, not America's war or a proxy war. We have the ability and the resolve to do it. We lack only the capacity. "Washington could solve the problem by giving drones to the Pakistan army, he said.

Divided against itself, the civilian leaders in Pakistan will not undermine the useless strategy devised by the securocrats for fear of a coup. No doubt, the insurgency will return, fed from the wellspring of fundamentalist activity directed against Karzai.

Pakistan trends radioactive

Pakistan's campaign in southern Waziristan, against Taliban threatening the integrity of their state, has been successful, in part. The Taliban of North Waziristan, fuelling the insurgency in Afghanistan, remain untouched. News is threading through of redeployment by the insurgents to Orakzai, near Peshawar, and a direct threat to NATO supply lines.

The question of Pakistani fragmentation and the consequences for the nuclear arsenal are rarely aired in public. Even if they are, bland assurances of current security are given, leaving detailed assessments of the security threat in private. Pakistan is a radioactively hot topic.

The Taliban pawns taken by the Pakistani castle, the king powerless

Despite the vigorous short-term success of the campaign in the tribal areas, Pakistan's crisis has not dissipated. A shot across the bows was provided by the new American aid bill, as a focal point for dissatisfaction with dependency upon the USA. Now this pervasive opposition is spreading throughout society.

The country is swamped by theories of paranoia, 'stab in the back' and conspiracies. Instead of seeking internal solutions for the instability and low intensity conflict that has disfigured their country, Pakistan blames external enemies. Understandable from a past history of defeat and schism, yet vulnerable to political upheaval and constitutional betrayal.

Political disruption and a lack of legitimacy are long-term problems that provide a conduit for a process of Islamification and revolutionary change, driven from the bottom up and co-opted by factions within the elites. The Taliban did not prove to be the useful disruptor and have therefore been attacked, as a reminder that jihadists are useful pawns, not allies.

Settling in for the long war in Pakistan

The war against the Taliban in Pakistan is popular. Polls amongst the urban population who are more likely to have a telephone recognise the terrorist threat. Who would not be sick and tired of the indiscriminate bombings and climate of fear?

The Pakistan army continues to penetrate Waziristan and take territorial strongholds. Such an enterprise is not a symptom of victory as the British in Helmand will testify. The Tehrek-e-Taliban are already fighting an insurgency across the Durand line. They have stated that they will undertake the same tactics against the Pakistan army settling in for a long war. Outnumbered three to one, the Taliban are motivated and experienced in using the mountainous terrain to their advantage, whilst using the suicide bomb against Pakistani civilians.

The bullet and the bomb will be the watchwords of the jihadists in Pakistan for many months to come, and who would bet on the resilience of this partially failed state.

Pakistani consensus falls away

The military campaign undertaken in southern Waziristan by the Pakistan army is a necessary measure. The elites have found that their social legitimacy has been undermined by the depredations of the Taliban, feeding upon a pre-revolutionary situation amongst the rural dispossessed. The link-up between the Waziristan cohorts and Punjabi elements was proved by the series of suicide bombings over the last fortnight.

The success or failure of this campaign is linked to the continual presence of NATO in Afghanistan. If the Pakistani elites prove incapable of defeating this insurgency in the tribal areas and overcoming radicalism in the heartlands of Punjab and the Sindh, then their country will shift to a new level of instability. Eric Margolies, in an op-ed, states that the actions of the United States have proved counter-productive in welding the military and the political elites. Some inaccurate reporting on US attempts to gain control of the Pakistan military is followed by speculation on a military coup.

Margolies is too certain for this uncertain environment, though he is one of the few to recognise the hugle level of anti-american sentiment in the country. The aid bill is not necessarily a channel for US control, though it is an obvious and overt conduit of influence. It exerts civilian control over the military and has led to disruption. Yet, the mishandling of Pakistan's internal affairs could prove disastrous for NATO.

Pakistan rollback

Iran has attempted to neuter the contemporary diplomatic offensive through a studied engagement with the IAEA. This complicates the argument for those who view the entire strategy as one of obfuscation and delay, using the non-proliferation treaty. Like NKor, they may be talked into acquiescence.

The real threat lies east with its neighbour, Pakistan. As this Jamestown study shows, the Taliban were preparing to discuss the seizure of Pakistan's nuclear capability as they travelled down into the Swat Valley. This proved to be the high point of their territorial expansion. Recent work has shown that the Pakistani security forces continue to roll up the Taliban networks and arrest their leaders. Adroit publicity of the Taliban state of terror, as implemented, leads to popular support for the army as liberators. The Pakistani army is not one to miss an opportunity that shores up its support.

The long-term danger remains. Taliban insurgents raise support through a revolutionary appeal against the feudal class. In the Punjab, they are beginning to gain a territorial foothold. To oppose this, the local elders have set up Lashkars, local militias who patrol the borders with the adjacent tribal areas.

Despite some rollback, the Islamisation of Pakistan slowly continues, at the expense of the populace and their future. How long can the current democracy last?