The floods that have hit the north-west region of Pakistan will prove a heavy burden for the government and the state. Pakistan's crisis is a crisis of legitimacy, where the acceptance of the state is challenged by religious fundamentalists who deny a division between Allah and Caesar. The problem for its elites lies in the acquiescence of the population to this challenge. The floods are now affecting 12 millions, and these 12 millions will accept help from any quarter. Once the waters subside and the anger crystallizes, they will range in their responses: a sullen fatalism, a radicalised anger, a disillusionment with democracy and a willingness to consider theocratic alternatives.
The national government's response has appeared chaotic at times, and
confidence in its ability to cope has been shaken by the decision of
President Asif Ali Zardari to visit France and England amid the crisis.
Reports have indicated that Islamist organisation fill some of the gaps in this uncoordinated response. It is not clear how extensive their organisations are, but they are quick to publicise their own aid, however feeble it may be. Yet, they may well have contributed to this chaos by weakening the traditional tribal structures and support networks that usually come into play during natural disasters. The Islamists in the north-west provinces may have reduced the resilience of these communities by their presence and actions.
The government is estimated to have brought some aid to 40% of the affected population, often in wretched conditions. Although, comparisons with the Islamist charities are difficult, the modus operandi provides some telling and tentative conclusions. US and other western aid is mediated through other organisations and 'hidden':
American helicopters began evacuating people and ferrying supplies this
week. But some of the $35 million in aid put up by Washington will come
in cash or be channeled through local or international groups, denying
the unpopular Americans the chance to improve their image with
Pakistanis face to face.
The Islamist charities, aided by local knowledge and workers, can move swiftly to respond; their advantages are then milked for ideological advantage. The natural catastrophe will aid recruitment and financial support. It depends upon what form this takes: further substitution of the state by the Taliban, electoral support for Islamist parties, or an upsurge in terrorism? We will know by the autumn,