The alliance between the Egyptian armed forces and the Muslim Brotherhood has culminated in a civilian Islamist government. Were the Egyptian military aware of Islamist sympathisers within their own ranks? Was their action an awareness of weakness and an attempt to forestall military division from the junior officers?
Yet, if the generals threw Mubarak away to preserve a role, they also rejected the Turkish route. The armed forces were the guardians of Kemalite modernity whereas Egypt has forged continuity. The revolution is a blind that maintains the President as Pharoah: replacing Nasserite senility with the broad based support of the Brotherhood. The military maintain a role within the written constitution.
The Brotherhood are also weakened by their assumption of power. They did not have the full support of the nation and, by turning their back on democratisation through a series of legal wheezes and unfair Napoleonic manoevres, have polarised the nation. Now they have to resolve the economic and social problems that led to the fall of Mubarak.
Morsi has just changed the Islamist component of his cabinet: introducing more Islamists and removing technocrats. The negotiations with the IMF are almost complete and Morsi wants a Brotherhood spokesman to appear as the face of success. And this is the problem for them. They have achieved power but they are used to opposition. The experience of oppression has led them to seize as much power as they can, in law and position; replicating the structural mistakes of the old regime. Morsi is Mubarak's mirror image in Muslim guise.
The Brotherhood are strong enough to dominate the government, yet too weak to control the nation. Now they are the responsible party; and given their inexperience, they should enjoy their height of support. One wonders how they will handle disaffection or rising food prices?