Here is a conceit worthy of further consideration by the Chilcot Inquiry.
The reality is that Iraq was hotly debated in Whitehall, Westminster and far beyond. Up to a million people marched in protest; the cabinet backed war; and, after a tempestuous debate, the House of Commons voted for the invasion.
That majority depended on the Conservatives. Mr Blair’s warnings about WMD were almost modest against those of some senior Tories. William Hague, now the shadow foreign secretary, spoke of scores of hidden nuclear sites. The Liberal Democrats opposed the invasion, but still signed up to the conventional wisdom that Saddam had unconventional weapons.
The Tories were not hoodwinked by Mr Blair. They had their own briefings from intelligence chiefs. So it seems at best strange that an investigation into whether Mr Blair exaggerated the threat excludes questions about why the opposition made the same mistake.
The role of the official Opposition deserves greater scrutiny from the Chilcot Inquiry. Did their political statements match up with the intelligence they were briefed? Was that intelligence briefing the same as that given to Blair and did the same errors creep in to its presentation? There is scope for further examination here.