Occasionally, potential friction between US and UK forces was leaked to the papers. Often, this was directed at Afghanistan, not Iraq. However, the latest leaks, a series designed to destabilise the MOD prior to the start of the Chilcot report, have cast a question mark over potential co-operation with the United States armed forces.
The major criticisms involve an inability to communicate or co-operate with allies: of having an imperious attitude that leads to contempt:
General Stewart bluntly admitted that “our ability to influence US policy in Iraq seemed to be minimal.” He said that “incredibly,” there was not even a secure communication link between his headquarters in Basra and the US commander, General Rick Sanchez, in Baghdad.
Col Tanner said that General Sanchez “only visited us once in seven months.” Col Tanner also added that he only spoke to his own US counterpart, the chief of staff at the US corps headquarters in the Green Zone, once over the same period.
Top British commanders angrily described in the documents how they were not even told, let alone consulted, about major changes to US policy which had significant implications for them and their men.
Only historians will be able to tell how far this lack of communication impacted upon British operations. The Pentagon, as managed by Donald Rumsfeld, was reputed to be unsympathetic to coalitions or co-operation. The evidence of the British generals seems to bear this out. Understanding the impact of your policies upon your allies is basic courtesy, one that was not adhered to, according to our armed forces:
When the Americans decided, in March 2004, to arrest a key lieutenant of the Shia leader Muqtada al-Sadr – an event that triggered an uprising throughout the British sector – “it was not co-ordinated with us and no-one [was] told that it was going to happen,” said the senior British field commander at the time, Brigadier Nick Carter.
“Had we known, we would at least have been able to prepare the ground.” Instead, “the consequence [was] that my whole area of operations went up in smoke… as a result of coalition operations that were outwith my control or knowledge and proved to be the single most awkward event of my tour.”
Yet, none of these problems were addressed at the time. Our generals expect plaudits for evading American orders, rather than dealing with the increasing problems of the Iraqi insurgency that forced the Basra scuttle. To ride the populist vehicle of Anti-Americanism to distract from the strategic and political errors carried out by the MOD and the top brass would be contemptible: scapegoating Rome to avoid the shortcomings of Greece.