Tinpot emirs versus direct rule

The Pakistani elites have decided to undertake a momentous move in the last few days by opening up a second front in their campaign against the neo-Taliban in Waziristan. Despite the unpopularity of the war amongst the Pakistani population, the army and politicians have agreed that the insurgency poses a graver threat than originally thought. This is a strong move considering that the Pakistani army is now stretched thin, with forces moved away from the eastern border, against their traditional enemy, India. The strategic framework allows redeployment of thinly stretched forces to combat an insurgency, now that the nuclear umbrella stretches towards Delhi. The conclusion is twofold: the Taliban is now considered to pose a greater threat than appeasement indicated and Pakistan is more dependent upon its nuclear weapons than ever. Truth and consequences: a conventional war with India would soon go hot.

This fragile and fissile country is now odds on moving towards some form of adjustment. When the Taliban reached the Swat valley without resistance, co-optation of the elites appeared one option, set against a background of incipient social revolution. The school of Islamic naxalites and shari'a tyranny was replaced by invasion, devastation and refugee camps. The elites, especially the military establishment, decided to fight back.

What remained of Pakistan in 1971 became a plaything of the military-feudal-political elite who turned it into a back office for the outsourced wars of big powers. Three decades later, Pakistan represents state failure, religious extremism, terrorism, nuclear proliferation. Few dispensations have failed their people on the scale that Pakistan has: it exists solely to provide subsistence to the military establishment.

Internal reasons rather than external US pressure may have caused this escalation from firefight to insurgency, and we cannot forget that we have seen such suppression before, replaced by treaties and safe zones. Part of this is due to the collapse of the tribal system of governance. The old laws of honour and elders have been corrupted and overthrown by fundamentalists profiting from the narcotics trade and funds financing Al-Qaeda. this process of modernisation has left a post-traditional society where an influx of ruthless and rootless terrorists, combined with a simpler set of values (Islamic might is right) has resulted in a new collection of bandits and warlords.

While US forces were vainly trying to hunt down al-Qaeda in the Tora Bora mountains, the group was focused on establishing links with organizations such as the Jaishul al-Qiba al-Jihadi al-Siri al-Alami and Jundallah in the Pakistani tribal areas and organizing the recruitment of Pakistanis and Afghans to those organizations. The underlying reason for doing this was to destroy the local political and social structures and in their place establish an al-Qaeda franchise.

The plan worked. Today, in many parts of the Hindu Kush corridor, centuries-old tribal systems and their connections with the Pakistani establishment through an appointed political agent have been replaced by a system of Islamic warlordism.

The old breed of tribal elders, religious clerics and tribal chiefs, loyal to Pakistan and its systems, has been wiped out, to be replaced by warlords such as Haji Omar, Baitullah Mehsud, (slain) Nek Mohammad and (slain) Abdullah Mehsud. They are all al-Qaeda allies, and allow al-Qaeda freedom of movement in their areas within the corridor. 

Pakistani armies hope to overturn these tinpot satrapies in political circumstances, similar to the revival of the Islamist forces in Somalia. It is quite clear that the trappings of a failed state no longer appealed to the military, and now that the tribes have collapsed, despots may be swept away in favour of direct rule. The longer lasting consequence may be a strengthening of the Pakistani state.

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