The expulsion of two diplomats is now represented as a misunderstanding. Reuters reports that the two were assessing the town of Musa Qala in Helmand province for UN and EU aid. This assessment included talks with tribal factions in the region who were not supportive of the government, though they could be viewed as mercenary supporters of the insurgents. In this murky sewer, all actions are compromises and open to question:
A spokesman for the UN in Afghanistan, Aleem Siddique, said the affair was a misunderstanding that arose after the men visited the Helmand town of Musa Qala, recaptured this month after 10 months under Taliban control.
The men visited the area to assess "stabilisation" efforts after the military offensive, Mr Siddique said. They spoke to locals including "people who are perhaps undecided whether they are supportive of the Government of Afghanistan".
One foreign power may have been talking to the Taliban at this time. Reuters also reports that MI6 were talking to elements of the Taliban, to the distaste of the United States and the co-operation of Afghan officials.
Officers from the Secret Intelligence Service - MI6's official name - held discussions, or jirgas, with senior insurgents several times in the northern summer.
"The SIS officers were understood to have sought peace directly with the Taliban, with them coming across as some sort of armed militia," a source said. The British would also provide "mentoring" for the Taliban....
The half dozen meetings between MI6 agents and the Taliban took place at houses on the outskirts of Lashkah Gah and in villages in the upper Gereshk valley, to the north-east of Helmand's main town.
To maintain the stance that the Aghan Government was leading the negotiations, the clandestine meetings took place in the presence of Afghan officials.
"These meetings were with up to a dozen Taliban or with Taliban who had only recently laid down their arms," an intelligence source said. "The impression was that these were important motivating figures inside the Taliban."
Peeling off militia in the short term is a useful tactic, but it is not a long-term strategy. Our actions in Afghanistan should not be constrained by lipservice to an ideological rhetoric. Such contacts are assessed upon whether they are actually useful.
Brown denied any contacts with the Taliban, but MI6 would not have sanctioned these meetings without the foreknowledge of their political masters. After the demonstration of political primacy over military engagement in Basra, are we to believe that the actions of MI6 were not planned and directed by the government. That is why these contacts should be opposed. Not because we should recoil from meetings with enemies, however distasteful, because they fit into some moral definition of violence and fear. But because they are pursued by a government that elevates short term advantage in politics and has sacrificed military strategy to this goal.
They did not know what they were doing in Basra. They do not know what they are doing in Helmand. They do not have a plan for resolving Afghanistan and they will be unable to defeat the Taliban with their current approach.