There is nothing predictable about the Middle East except for the
anguished
cries of commentators who bemoan the latest war crime, the
latest roadmap to
some tolerable truce and the latest terrorist outrage
carried out by the
Militant Tendency, if you believe BBC understatement.
As the Israeli campaign
has ground on and Hezbollah has cowered within
its civilian camouflage, a
chorus of "What is to be done?" has permeated
our newspapers and television
screens.
Such cries of help are usually the stimulus for Tony Blair to
add his
ha'penny voice to the international great and the good that gather
at
emergency conferences, writing resolutions that will solve
wars,
insurgencies and genocides. But if, like the Darfur genocide,
these
problems prove too intractable for their talking shops, the
diplomatic
caravanserai will migrate towards a more welcoming watering hole.
Her
Majesty's Government made noises on the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict
some three years ago, when Blair organised a conference, hoping that
his
Belfast triumph might magically transpose to the Middle East through
the
wand of British diplomacy. Alas, like all such endeavours,
this
conference was sucked into the sands and never heard of
again.
Postwar British governments have never had much luck in the Middle
East.
The fiftieth anniversary of Suez has proved an opportune moment for
many
to reminisce on our most disastrous intervention of all. We were
allied
with the Israelis and the French in a clever plan to seize back the
Suez
Canal, a strategic waterway run by a privately owned company based
in
Paris that was sequestered by Nasser, the dictator of Egypt, so that
he
could dam the Nile and posture as an Arab champion. The United States
of
America, under President Eisenhower, broke Great Britain and France
in
what has possibly proved to be the superpower's most foolish
foreign
policy decision since 1945. This spelt an end to most
independent
military action on our part and left France as an estranged
onlooker,
increasingly embittered and striving to undermine US dominance in
favour
of a multipolar world.
Yet, even when this was combined with
the ratchet effect of relative
decline, British foreign policy has appeared
distinctive through
delusions of influence over the United States. Harold
Macmillan
described a comfort blanket of Athenian guidance to Kennedy's
Rome.
Margaret Thatcher waved her handbag at Ronald Reagan and talked
Hayek
and bombs. Such interventions always had a certain effect,
but
Atlanticists have exaggerated history, knowing full well that we
are
regarded as a second rate ally, a useful tool, but no more so
than
Germany, Japan or Israel. Great Britain needs a dose of realism in
our
special relationship with America now that Blair has proved a
disastrous
pilot.
Realism is one thing that you also will not find in
reports on wars or
diplomacy. Truthfully, we just do not know what is going
on in Beirut or
in Number Ten. Tony Blair was gravely damaged by his inept
conversation
with President Bush, where his old instincts for diplomatic
intervention
came to the fore. His silence, and the silence of other
Ministers, on
the issue of a ceasefire and a peacekeeping force, could be
genuine
disdain for a war that has already exacted political costs. Or he
may
have nothing to contribute to an international peacekeeping force as
the
military pot is empty. Our troops, overstretched in Iraq
and
Afghanistan, could not be redeployed to Lebanon. Blair, without the
boys
to back him up, kept mum until the Cabinet pressure cooker required a
UN
release. He was watching his performance in 2003, since the Iraqi
rerun
on Friday was a conference with Bush to draft a UN
resolution.
We should be grateful that Blair is unable to commit us a
third theatre
of war. The Israelis have proved very careless with the lives
of
Lebanese civilians because they are unwilling to re-enter one of
their
military nightmares: the occupation of Lebanon. Nor will the United
States
entertain the idea of their troops participating in a
peacekeeping
force. On October 23rd, 1983, 220 US Marines were killed in
their
barracks at Beirut Airport by a suicide bomber whilst keeping the
peace.
The Marines were joined in death by 58 French paratroopers through
a
second suicide bomber.
If such a peacekeeping force is toothless,
then Hezbollah will ignore it
and concentrate upon its immediate goals:
terrorist incursions, rocket
attacks and insurgency within northern Israel.
If the peacekeeping force
is strong enough to enforce the ceasefire, then
Hezbollah may well turn
on them, using proxies to strike and kill the
soldiers of whatever
country was foolish enough to commit them to the
maelstrom. Then they
can take up their favourite pastime of firing rockets
from someone's
backyard, hiding in the civilian population.
Blair
moves in time to the American drum, and is accused of poodleism.
If he did
have a foreign policy of his own, then he would prove more
vocal in his
attacks of the Israelis, pandering to a domestic audience
by burnishing his
internationalist credentials. Then, he would do
nothing except hold a
conference and talk about a truce. The outcome is
the same whether countries
are allies of Israel or internationalist
critics. They can do nothing without
a ceasefire, and that lies within
the gift of two actors: Israel and
Hezbollah.
Britain was an aggressive supporter of liberal
internationalism under
Blair. Now, that distinctive strand of his
politics is diminished, we are left
with the "special relationship", and a
humiliating perception of
submission. From Trident to Iraq to the Natwest
Three, Blair's
government has undermined our sense of worth and demeaned the
alliance
that they consider the lynchpin of our security. Britain still lives
in
a world of nation states. Britain still has strong armed forces and
many
interests throughout the world: emigrants, daughter nations
and
commerce.
(Cross posted to Airstrip One)