It is unclear how decisions concerning Basra were decided between the Ministry of Defence, local forces and the Iraqi representatives. The 'hearts and minds' approach where security has been mediated through local structures proved successful in stabilising the southern Shi'a sphere of Iraq despite occasional disturbances. The proof is the lack of an insurgency developing along the lines of the Sunni triangle.
However, there are vulnerabilities with the approach that the British forces have undertaken, vulnerabilities that have been reinforced by the decision to tolerate the existence of Shi'a militias. The Al-Sadr army and the Badr brigade have become local protection societies, overriding the traditional influence of the clerics. In a predictable development, militias have infiltrated the official security services and have started targeting British reconnaisance in the area.
The actions of the militias are still a mystery. This challenge may be an attempt to cow the British forcse and hasten their withdrawal. If so, it has failed. The Ministry of Defence is now determined to replace the police force in Basra and lengthen the period of deployment in order to ensure that the militias do not gain local dominance.
Reid ordered a root-and-branch review of security in the troubled province following last week's disastrous clashes between British troops and Iraqi police.
The violence has also led to the scrapping of a detailed plan that could have seen UK forces withdrawn by May next year. Instead, it now seems certain Prime Minister Tony Blair will have to keep British troops in the country until 2007 at the earliest.
The sudden U-turn on Britain's military commitment to Iraq has caused anger and despair in military circles. One former defence chief told Scotland on Sunday the Iraq expedition had been a "colossal political failure".
In comments that will pile pressure on Blair over his handling of the conflict, General Anthony Walker, a former Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, told Scotland on Sunday: "The soldiers should have said to the politicians 'f*** this, we are not going into this conflict until you tell us how you are going to deal with this country once we have won you the war'.
These developments have to be linked with the extremist stance of the Iranian government, who have extended their influence in the post-Saddam environment. Most of the Iraqi Shi'as are unwilling to consider Iranian dominance but they accept Shi'a help in order to shorten the occupation and assert majority rule. Given the example of the Iranian majlis, Shi'as view democratisation as a guarantor of their power.
The Iranians have overextended their hand and played a round too early. Aware of Saudi concerns over Iranian influence and unwilling to provide a haven for terrorist activities, the British have now had to ensure that the local security forces are restructured on a more robust footing. This increases the probability that Britain has to scale down any reinforcements for Afghanistan or seriously tackle the problems of overstretch.