The cliffhanger Iraqi constitution has proved the spark that has lit combustible conflicts amongst the Shi'a community. In the southern zone, where British reconstruction has gradually been replaced by the rule of the local elites, Amarah has become a city dominated by fighting between al-Sadr's Mahdi Army and the militias of the Badr Brigade, the armed wing of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq. Whilst the conflict has been reported as an ideological fight between those who support Shi'a autonomy in the south and the centralisers of the Badr brigade in Iraq, the primary objective is money. Federalism ensures that oil revenues remain in the provinces, reducing the amount that al-Sadr could dole out to his supporters. Nor is it clear how this broader concern interacts with the influence of Iran or wider support for the Constitution.
Articles such as this one in the Sunday Herald, providing airtime to the oil poor Sunnis, provide an unbalanced perspective on how the various powers have negotiated the constitution. One quote (unnamed) says it all really:
As a retired Arab specialist in the Foreign Office told the Sunday Herald last night: “Like it or not, we are heading for a theocracy – the constitution is a disaster for all Iraqis who longed for democracy and the creation of a secular state.”
As a consequence, British forces are no longer intervening as local militias battle to win control of cities such as Najaf or Amarah:
But to the surprise of officers at Camp Abu Naji, just outside the city, commanders ordered the 700-odd troops to remain in barracks. Yesterday, Army officials insisted that a tactical assessment had led them to decide that intervention was "not required". Other military sources, however, said the city was allowed to fall out of control.....
"There were at least 70 explosions logged on Wednesday night, which even by Amarah's standards is extraordinarily violent," said one source. "In the past we would have done a serious show of force, but this time the order was given not to enter the city. That seems to be part of the new policy of allowing Iraqis to find their own 'equilibrium'.
"But there is a difference between that and losing control of the place completely."
Military sources that appear to disagree with this amended strategy have tentatively voiced their dissatisfaction in the Sunday Telegraph. Yet, with the election of a hardline government in Tehran, the British government must sense that the armed forces may have been transformed from 'occupiers' to 'hostages'. Perhaps this is a recognition of new realities - that Iranian influence may be fought out in Iraq amongst different parties and factions. Then the question becomes: who is Khameini backing?
A recent article in Time details the support that Iran has given the Badr Brigades and the fundamentalist militias that established themselves across southern Iraq after the fall of the Ba'athist regime. Now factions within Iran are attempting to develop an insurgency in Shi'a territory that attacks coalition troops, using tactics developed by Hizbullah. Therefore, based on the flows of money and territory, Shi'a autonomy in the South is favoured by Iran as an easier route to influence, but al-Sadr is fighting for continued financial assistance, rather than for a developed sense of Iraqi autonomy.