Armed farces

Is there a mismatch between the actions of the British Army and the perceptions pervading the wars on the Home Front? Not one politician, commentator or army officer is willing to entertain some necessary truths?

But the British experiences both there and in Iraq have been utterly demoralising. The British army has been defeated in Basra. It can no longer take on the Mahdi militia in the city. Indeed, its

rule extends solely to the perimeter of the single air-base from which one day soon it will make its ignominious, Saigon-style vertical exit, to be replaced by the US Marine Corps.

The situation in Basra is compared to the defeat in Tobruk. An overstretched, demoralised army has been betrayed by a government that deferred reform of the armed forces in favour of pork, that cut cash to the infantry when all reserves were trimmed and that took on new commitments without extra money or soldiers.

Whilst debate has concentrated upon the consequences of neglect for the deaths of individual soldiers and the undermining of the re-invented 'military covenant', the wider implications of these defeats for Britain's standing in the world remains unremarked.

In other words, the situation is critical -- but you'd never know it from politicians, military leaders or the media. You'd never gather from the BBC or ITN that in Basra, the British face their biggest military humiliation since Tobruk. "The difference is, we fought at Tobruk," one British officer observed dryly. There is actually one other difference. Rommel's men were civilised.

Britain's standing in the world has been severely reduced by this war. Our usefulness to the United States is diminished as the Pentagon realises that allies without sufficient infantry create burdens and do not alleviate them (see Britain in Basra). An ungentle reminder that the primary purpose of our armed forces is to defend Britain, not as a shieldmaiden for NATO.

The major lesson from this debacle is the need for more infantry and less toys. If we had more boots on the ground, we would have had a better chance of holding Basra and controlling the Helmand warzone. If four years too late, our experiences confound the unwitting followers of Rumsfeld's expeditionary lite in the MOD.